The airfreight industry was probably not on Duke Ellington’s mind when he wrote his famous “It Don’t Mean a Thing (If it Ain’t Got That Swing).” But that tune would have been the perfect backdrop for a recent day-long debate on cargo and data screening harmonization that took place in Washington, D.C. (which happens to be Ellington’s hometown).
Why? Because as the United States draws closer to the expiration of one important international screening agreement and the implementation of another, serious questions remain on how nations will be working together in balancing the job of keeping passengers safe and cargo moving on time. Clearly, success in this endeavor will depend on getting the “harmony” right and getting everyone “swinging” together.
We’ve learned this from our previous experiences in addressing air cargo security challenges. To be effective, security rules have to be harmonized across nations. By that I mean we need to have agreement on key principles for air cargo security, minimum baseline requirements and a common language, where all nations “sing from the same sheet of music” in implementing physical and data screen programs.
Unfortunately, in the current round, the orchestra has not yet found a way to play a harmonized tune.
The progress of pre-loading advanced cargo shipping information programs is being followed closely by the World Customs Organization (WCO) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and these institutions have established a Joint Working Group on Advance Cargo Information (JWGACI) to consider global issues related to advance data regimes. This is a positive step, but several challenges still exist that should have us all concerned.
The U.S., itself, has seen tremendous success in allowing supply chain screening of selected shipments. The Certified Cargo Screening Program enables forwarders and shippers to screen outside the airport while enabling the resolution of any questions resulting from targeting analysis. But, unfortunately, some mutual-recognition countries will not allow supply chain screening of selected shipments, presenting a challenge in allowing targeting issues to be resolved.
In the European Union, the differences in technological capability of the 28 member states, combined with disparate points of view about high-risk meanings, could begin to impede the flow of commerce for transit freight passing through the EU itself. These differing risk standards and definitions between EU countries and other nations may result in multiple screenings for such cargo so that it meets all of the different requirements. With no solution in sight, mutual recognition agreements between the Air Cargo Advance Screening (ACAS) program in the U.S. and its European counterpart looks like it could be a pipe dream.
ACAS was the first advanced data targeting initiative in the wake of the October 2010 Yemen incident, in which terrorists shipped explosives in toner cartridges within printers on cargo flights to the U.S. Since then, pilot security enhancement programs have been undertaken in the U.S., EU, and Canada, with the understanding that the U.S. would serve as a model from which other programs could be derived. But, five years later, we still have yet to see its proposed rulemaking from U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and many operational questions remain unanswered.
For instance, will the different systems be harmonized in terms of data elements, dual filing, decoupling, message requirements and others? Will carriers and freight forwarders be required to make three separate submissions? What screening protocols will be required, when and where can they be carried out and how will they be recognized at the transit hubs? What happens when multiple airlines are involved? And, perhaps most urgently, in the absence of a U.S. rule proposal, what happens if other countries get tired of waiting and develop their own systems?
In June, TSA expressed concerns about certain aspects of the EU and other programs covered under the National Cargo Security Program (NCSP) mutual recognition agreements for physical cargo inspection. Since the TSA does not have the authority to establish screening programs overseas, inspection of air cargo originating from foreign countries must have the cooperation of those nations in carrying a level of security commensurate with U.S. security measures.
In letters drafted by The International Air Cargo Association and signed by a broad stakeholder coalition, the industry expressed its strong concern about the impacts that changes to the existing NCSP agreements could have on the air cargo supply chain and U.S. commerce. The agreements have themselves been significant facilitative achievements for the entire air cargo supply chain and have ensured that a high level of security is maintained, commensurate with U.S. security programs, while allowing carriers and forwarders to streamline their procedures and operations.
If TSA has concerns about certain foreign government policies and is leaning towards not renewing all existing NCSP agreements, we expect industry would be consulted on the renewal process. TSA must be mindful that, given these agreements are with many U.S. trading partners, these countries are likely to respond in kind to any TSA action changing the agreements and could have a dramatic impact on U.S. export shipments, as well as imports.
Failure to address this reality will likely not play well for the U.S., as it struggles to sing in regulatory concert with other nations. The tune won’t have that swing. And it won’t mean a thing.