Aviation increasingly faces threat of satellite interference

Satellite jamming and spoofing are growing concerns for the aviation industry, which uses satellites to monitor aircraft positioning, navigation, orientation and timing. [caption id="attachment_57140452" align="alignright" width="300"] (AI-generated image)[/caption] The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and IATA held a workshop last month to discuss the growing dangers of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing and jamming and the actions needed to mitigate the threat. GNSS is a service based on satellite constellations such as the United States’ Global Positioning System (GPS) and the European Union’s Galileo. “GNSS systems offer tremendous advantages to aviation in increasing the safety of operations in a busy shared airspace,” EASA acting Executive Director Luc Tytgat said in a joint release from IATA and EASA. “But we have seen a sharp rise in attacks on these systems, which poses a safety risk.” Jamming is when the satellite signal is blocked and spoofing is when the desired satellite signal is replaced by an undesired signal transmitting false information. GNSS jamming and spoofing incidents have increasingly threatened the integrity of positioning, navigation and timing services globally in recent years, according to the release. This uptick is especially evident around war zones. “We noticed a significant increase when the conflict started between Russia and Ukraine,” Stuart Fox , director of flight and technical operations in IATA’s Operations, Safety and Security division, told Air Cargo Next . “Of course, the Middle East and conflict there hasn’t helped the situation.” GPSJam.org is an open-source website that tracks reported interference to GPS. The cluster of red dots in and around Israel and the Black Sea shows the prevalence of GNSS interference in those regions. While EASA has noted an increase in reports of GNSS interference, it did not have precise figures, spokesperson Vera Tavares told Air Cargo Next . GNSS in aviation The use of GNSS in aviation has increased as technology has advanced. “Aircraft historically didn’t use [GNSS] at all,” Fox said. “When I started flying in the late-’80s, ’90s, they weren’t being used. Conventional ground-based navigation, as well as other pieces of equipment, avionics and aircraft, were used to navigate the globe. But increasingly we saw the use of these types of systems to assess the accuracy in navigating. “So, basically, GPS is used to improve accuracy and navigation,” he said. “It’s integrated into the other sources of navigation, whether it’s ground-based ones or ... inertial reference systems, which are sort of spinning gyros.” Inertial reference systems are a component of an aircraft’s inertial navigation system, which uses sensors, such as gyroscopes, and a computer to continuously calculate the plane’s location, orientation and velocity. The inertial reference system is usually combined with a GNSS-receiving and sensor-integration software to show flight crew the plane’s location, even when GNSS signals are unavailable, according to Honeywell Aerospace Technologies . Jamming and spoofing “GNSS jamming, basically, is an adversary generating interference on the specific bands in the specific spectrum where satellites from the GNSS are transmitting ... either timing or position or navigation — or a combination of all of them,” Rodrigo Gomez , chief architect at OneWeb Technologies , which provides tech solutions in the commercial satellite communications sector, told Air Cargo Next . “Then they are denying timing or denying position. What you’re doing is killing the ability of those systems to operate normally.” Spoofing is “a more sophisticated attack,” Gomez said. “When you’re doing spoofing, you need to put an attacker [signal] somewhere between the [legitimate] signals to start simulating that you are a desired signal,” he said. “You’re not jamming to deny that signal. What you’re doing is generating a different signal that makes [the target] miscalculate ... to drift [them] to another place or to make [them] think that [they’re] in a different place.” The purpose of spoofing is to derail normal operations. “So, if you have a convoy, that convoy is taking one path,” Gomez said. “If you’re spoofing, you’re trying to divert [the convoy]. And instead of taking that safe path, [they’re] taking the wrong path.” The more convincing the spoofed signals are, the more likely that the aircraft will use the spoofed GNSS in its navigation operations, EASA’s Tavares said. “The aircraft is then virtually teleported to another place, while of course its physical location is not altered,” Tavares said. “The autopilot will then try to correct the trajectory to go back to the originally planned route.” It is then up to pilots and flight crews to override the autopilot and switch to another mode that does not rely on GNSS input, she said. Jamming and spoofing do not just affect the targeted aircraft but can impact all aircraft in the area. “The problem with spoofing is that, when you’re in areas of conflict like Syria, Israel or Ukraine , what happens is ... when the adversaries are trying to spoof UAVs, for example, they’re also disrupting air traffic control for commercial airlines,” Gomez said. Collaboration to mitigate threats Mitigating threats from GNSS interference requires immediate solutions — and solutions that can be implemented down the line. “We immediately need to ensure that pilots and crews can identify the risks and know how to react and land safely,” EASA’s Tytgat said. “In the medium term, we will need to adapt the certification requirements of the navigation and landing systems. For the longer term, we need to ensure [EASA and IATA] are involved in the design of future satellite navigation systems.” IATA and EASA stressed the need for transparency regarding GNSS-interference events. “We need coordinated collection and sharing of GNSS safety data,” IATA Director General Willie Walsh said in the release. “Airlines will be critical partners. And whatever actions are taken, they must be the focal point of the solution as they are the front line facing the risk.” IATA and EASA are encouraging the creation of a central database of GNSS-interference cases on which carriers can rely. “Because all airlines mitigate the safety risks ... by knowing about these incidents, if [the incidents are] across different databases, it doesn’t help,” IATA’s Fox said. EASA and IATA also highlighted the following recommendations: Guidance from aircraft manufacturers to ensure operators are equipped to manage jamming and spoofing situations; Alerting relevant stakeholders, such as carriers, air navigation service providers and airports, about attacks; and Retaining a backup of traditional navigation aids. Other solutions might involve creating new technologies that do not rely on GNSS. “So, what we’re doing is working with other technology partners to create something we call the APNT — alternate position, navigation and timing,” OneWeb’s Gomez said. “APNT is basically going around the problem and creating alternate sources of that same information that we would normally get from the GPS constellation.” Technology companies Domo Tactical Communications and Inertial Labs last week announced a partnership to develop an APNT solution for uncrewed aviation systems. Register here for Air Cargo Next ’s free webinar, “The Role of Drones in the Future of Air Cargo,” on Tuesday, March 26, at 11 a.m. ET.

Aviation increasingly faces threat of satellite interference

Jamming, spoofing especially prevalent in war zones

Southwest Cargo plans $28M facility at DEN

2nd Modern Logistics 737-800BCF arrives in Brazil

Related Posts

Cyber Aviation Global Forum to explore advancing cybersecurity risks in aviation

Fraunhofer looks to bring autonomous tech to air cargo

More data scientists needed for increasingly digital industry

2nd Modern Logistics 737-800BCF arrives in Brazil

Cargo Facts Free Newsletters

Cargo Facts Connect Podcast

Follow Us

Welcome Back!

Retrieve your password