Middle East conflict disrupts global airfreight networks

The Iran war has created a significant shock to global air cargo networks, with impacts extending well beyond the Middle East. The disruption is driven by the loss of critical transfer cargo concentrated in Gulf hub systems. As a result, the operational effect on global airfreight has been disproportionately large relative to the region’s share of origin and destination cargo. Global air cargo volumes declined 8% to 10% week over week and 7% year over year for the week ending March 27, with the Middle East and South Asia regions down 30% week over week. Combined cargo traffic across the main Middle East hubs is approximately 8.3 million tonnes annually, or about 7% of global throughput, yet these hubs support roughly 13% of global air cargo capacity through their role in long-haul transfer networks. The immediate effect was the removal of 15% to 20% of global cargo capacity, which has now recovered to an 8% to 10% decline. Hub disruption, network concentration Figure 1: Middle East Cargo Hub Map and TTM (November 2025) Tonnage Visualization

As shown in our CFC Airport Tonnage Map ( Figure 1) , cargo flows are concentrated in a few high-throughput hubs. Doha and Dubai dominate regional throughput and act as primary consolidation points for intercontinental cargo flows. This concentration is quantified in monthly volumes. Figure 2: Middle East Hubs’ Estimated Monthly Traffic

Doha processes about 217,000 tonnes per month and Dubai 180,000 tonnes and account for more than half of total regional throughput, leaving the network heavily exposed to disruption at a small number of airports. Table 1: Middle East Hub Capacity Availability and Estimated Daily Throughput Loss

That exposure is visible in operating capacity. Doha is running at only 7% of baseline capacity, equating to a loss of approximately 6,742 tonnes per day. Dubai is operating at 31%, removing 4,153 tonnes per day. Combined, these two hubs account for more than 10,800 tonnes of daily throughput loss, representing most of the systemwide disruption. Capacity retention improves across secondary hubs but remains insufficient at scale. Abu Dhabi and Dubai World Central are operating at 27% and 36% capacity, respectively, while Riyadh and Jeddah retain 64% and 78%, respectively. These airports continue to function, but not at the level required to absorb displaced transfer volumes from Doha and Dubai. Muscat is the only hub operating above baseline, at 122% capacity, adding approximately 552 tonnes per day. However, with monthly throughput of just 13,576 tonnes, the gain is too small to materially offset losses elsewhere in the network. Table 1 shows that the shortfall is not broadly distributed across the region. It is concentrated at the largest transfer hubs, where lost throughput has the greatest effect on intercontinental cargo flows. Because approximately 9.5% of global cargo transits through Middle East hubs, disruption there removes transfer efficiency rather than local demand. The result is a shift toward longer routings, lower consolidation and reduced effective capacity across key corridors. Trade lane disruption, diversion dynamics The disruption is most visible on corridors that depend on Gulf hubs for east-west transfer traffic. As detailed in Table 2 , the sharpest immediate contraction has been on Asia-Middle East-Europe flows, where capacity fell 20% to 30% week over week and, in the earliest phase of the disruption, exceeded 40% by some measurements. Table 2: Capacity Impact and Network Adjustments

The response has been a reallocation of lift toward direct Asia-Europe flying. Capacity on those routes increased 20% to 26% week over week, according to our latest estimates, while some flow data points to rerouted volumes rose by more than 35% as carriers bypassed Gulf transit points. On a year-over-year basis, the same pattern is visible in scheduled deployment: Asia Pacific capacity into the Middle East is down 50%, Middle East-Europe is down 9% and direct Asia-Europe capacity is up 31%. For the trade lanes themselves, that means traffic has not disappeared so much as been redistributed to less efficient patterns. Cargo that would normally move through Doha or Dubai is being pushed onto longer nonstop sectors or secondary routings, which narrows schedule flexibility and reduces the number of viable connection options for forwarders. The pricing response follows that corridor stress. Rate increases of up to 70% on disrupted lanes show that the market is repricing specific trade flows. Operator exposure, hub dependency The disruption is concentrated among a small number of operators with hub-dependent network structures. Qatar Airways Cargo and Emirates SkyCargo represent the largest exposure due to their reliance on Doha and Dubai for transfer connectivity. Widebody belly capacity further amplifies the affect. Aircraft such as the 777-300ER and A350 typically carry 15 to 25 tonnes of cargo per flight. Reductions in passenger schedules therefore remove dedicated freighter capacity and embedded belly capacity simultaneously. Table 2 shows the estimated capacity impact along with primary airport and status where we see Qatar Airways being affected the most. Table 3: Operator Exposure and Status

Table 3 shows that Qatar Airways Cargo remains the most constrained at roughly 20% of normal capacity. This is a loss of a tightly banked hub structure in Doha that previously handled a large share of east-west transfer traffic. With that structure still mostly offline, Qatar has limited ability to rebuild connecting flows, even where individual routes are returning. Emirates has recovered faster, at around 75% of normal capacity, because Dubai retains partial operability and a larger local origin-destination base. This allows Emirates to restore point-to-point volumes first and rebuild transfer flows gradually. Etihad sits between the two at roughly 50%, with Abu Dhabi operating but without the scale or network density to fully replace lost connectivity. The speed advantage is shifting toward carriers and hubs that do not rely on a single constrained node. Turkish Cargo is operating above 90% of normal capacity, supported by Istanbul’s geographic position outside the disruption zone and its ability to handle both Europe-bound and Asia-bound flows without rerouting penalties. This makes it one of the most efficient substitutes for Gulf transfer traffic, particularly on Asia-Europe lanes. Secondary Gulf and near-Gulf hubs are seeing increased utilization, but at a smaller scale. Riyadh, Jeddah and Muscat are all absorbing diverted volumes, supported by Saudia Cargo and Oman Air . However, these hubs operate with lower baseline throughput and fewer long-haul frequencies, limiting their ability to replicate Doha’s or Dubai’s role. The shift toward these airports supports continuity of flow but does not restore prior connection density or scheduling flexibility. Non-Middle East carriers are largely maintaining existing capacity. Lufthansa Cargo , Air France-KLM Cargo , Cargolux , Cathay Cargo and Singapore Airlines Cargo are operating near normal levels and taking on incremental volumes, but primarily through direct routing and gateway concentration rather than replacing hub-based transfer networks. Fuel costs, operating economics Figure 3: U.S. Gulf Coast Jet Fuel Spot Price (USD/Gallon) – Through March 30, 2026

As shown in Figure 3 , jet fuel prices have increased sharply, reaching $4.45 per gallon at peak levels on March 20th before coming down to around $4.24 per gallon as of March 30. This compares to sub-$2.50 levels earlier in the year and a long-term average of approximately $2.62 per gallon. The current pricing environment represents a sustained increase of more than 50% from early-year levels and places fuel costs firmly within the range where airlines begin reducing marginal capacity. Fuel accounts for 20% to 30% of long-haul operating costs, and the impact is compounded by operational inefficiencies. Rerouting increases stage lengths, while reduced hub connectivity lowers load factors and limits consolidation. These factors reduce network efficiency as costs are increasing. Freight rates have already responded. Global airfreight pricing increased around 6% week over week to $2.67 per kilogram for the week ending March 23, with sharper increases on key corridors. Middle East-Europe rates rose 70%, while Middle East-U.S. rates increased 50%. The operational impact is also visible at the forwarder level. More than 75% of forwarders report disruption, with over two-thirds experiencing increased costs, reinforcing the affect of capacity constraints and rerouting on the broader logistics chain. Short-term outlook, structural implications Near-term adjustments remain tactical. Airlines are increasing direct long-haul flying and rerouting cargo through secondary hubs, but these changes maintain baseline connectivity rather than restore network efficiency. Capacity has partially recovered from initial disruption levels. Global air cargo capacity, which was down approximately 20% at the peak of the disruption, is now tracking only about 8% below prior-year levels. However, this recovery is relative to a higher baseline. Prior to the conflict, capacity had been increasing by 5.4% year over year against demand growth of 6% to 7%, leaving the market structurally tight even before the disruption. Recovery remains uneven across regions. Asia-Middle East capacity continues to operate below prior levels, while Asia-Europe direct capacity has increased materially to compensate for lost transfer connectivity. Recovery timelines remain measured in weeks rather than days. Backlogged cargo, aircraft rotations and scheduling constraints will delay normalization even if airspace restrictions ease. The current environment is defined by reduced effective capacity, higher operating costs and elevated rate volatility across key intercontinental corridors.

Middle East conflict disrupts global airfreight networks

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